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THE NEW WEST VIRGINIA ANTITRUST ACT
FROM THE DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE*
JAMEs F. RIL**
Sharply heightened attention is currently being paid to anti-
trust enforcement at the state level. In 1976, Congress appropri-
ated approximately $30,000,000 in federal funds to the states for
the maintenance of antitrust actions and other programs.' A fertile
field is being made available for the expenditure of these funds by
the focus of the federal antitrust enforcement agencies on the
larger structural cases with a corresponding decline in enforcement
actions against "routine" practices. In this climate, the opportuni-
ties for state actions are extremely favorable, especially in light of
the generally high political marks to be achieved by state Attor-
neys General, who are typically elected officials, in the commence-
ment of antitrust suits. As stated by Stephen J. Greenvogel, Mas-
sachusetts' antitrust division chief, "It looks good for an AG to say
he's suing this company or that company on antitrust grounds."'2
Not every state, however, has a fully developed antitrust stat-
ute to provide the framework for the intensified state enforcement
program. Legislatures are acting to fill the void. The most ambi-
tious and comprehensive action in this regard was the adoption by
West Virginia of an all-inclusive antitrust act in 1978.3 At first
blush from the defendant's standpoint, it is difficult to view the
new West Virginia Antitrust Act with overwhelming enthusiasm.
The Act basically follows the outlines of federal law while resolving
most open questions in favor of the government or private plaintiff.
Nevertheless, in part because of the parallel to federal law, and the
incorporation of federal decisional law under section 16 of the new
Act, there are numerous opportunities for all parties to take some
comfort from the provisions of the statute.
Several objectives manifest themselves in the new Antitrust
Act. First, there appears to be an attempt not merely to track the
* This article was originally presented as a lecture on September 8, 1978, at
the West Virginia University College of Law Conference on the West Virginia Anti-
trust Act of 1978.
** Partner, Collier, Shannon, Rill, Edwards & Scott, Washington, D.C.;
A.B., Dartmouth College, 1954; LL.B., Harvard University, 1959. Member, District
of Columbia Bar.
1 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976).
2 BusNmss WEEK, May 15, 1978, at 53.
3 W. VA. CODE §§ 47-18-1 to -23 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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substantive provisions of the Sherman Act but also to clarify its
specific applications. Second, the West Virginia Antitrust Act
seeks to provide the Antitrust Division with strong investigatory
and enforcement powers, also patterned after, but diverging from,
federal provisions. Finally, the Act is far more plaintiff-oriented
than federal law in its provision for parens patriae actions by the
Attorney General on behalf of citizens or residents of the state.
Substantial unresolved questions lurk beneath each of these statu-
tory objectives, however, and the courts will undoubtedly be re-
quired to make major decisions in the near future which will give
shape to the new Act and possibly stimulate further legislative
modifications. An examination of the provisions of this Act is
instructive not only for its application to practices in or affecting
West Virginia but also for the pattern it may set for the legislative
actions of other states. This analysis, while attempting to provide
a general overview, is designed to anticipate and discuss some
questions which might occur to defense counsel in attempting to
deal with the new statute.
I.
As to the substantive provisions of the new Act, an attempt is
made to identify practices which by definition "shall be deemed
to restrain trade or commerce unreasonably and are unlawful."4
The intent seems to be to isolate and condemn practices tradition-
ally unlawful per se under the Sherman Act: price-fixing, supply
control, market division, and boycott conspiracies.5 The effort to
define per se offenses may, however, have produced a result some-
what more expansive than that reached by the federal courts in
construing the Sherman Act.
Two examples will illustrate the point. Consider a small appli-
ance manufacturer who is seeking to enter the West Virginia mar-
ket and provide competition for larger, more established firms. In
order to obtain the maximum in-depth distribution of his product
and to entice distributors to handle it, the manufacturer, of his
own volition, seeks to establish exclusive territories. He agrees with
each of his new distributors that he will not sell to more than one
dealer in an assigned zone and exacts from the dealers the promise
that they will not sell to customers outside their assigned territory.
Id. § 3(b).
See United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Northern Pac. R.R.
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 228 F. Supp. 690, aff'd sub nom. Northern Pac.
R.R. v. United States, 379 U.S. 132 (1964), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965).
[Vol. 81
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It is at least theoretically possible that this arrangement would be
condemned as unlawful per se under section 3(d) (1) (C) of the state
Antitrust Act as an agreement between two or more persons allo-
cating geographic markets. After a long and tortured passage
through the federal courts, however, vertically imposed territorial
restrictions have come to be treated under the rule of reason in
Sherman Act litigation. The Supreme Court's reluctance to con-
demn vertically-established territorial exclusivity. in the case of
White Motor Company' was followed shortly by a sweeping per se
condemnation in Schwinn7 based partly on the "ancient rule" dis-
favoring restraints on alienation. Finally, the Supreme Court over-
ruled Schwinn in its 1977 GTE Sylvania decision,' and held that
henceforth vertical restraints would, in the absence of price-fixing,
be judged on the basis of their reasonableness. The issue consid-
ered by the courts in assessing reasonableness is essentially the
impact of the restraint on overall market competition, balancing
the limitation on intrabrand rivalry against the actual or antici-
pated benefit to competition regarding all products in the relevant
line of commerce.
Another area where the per se proscriptions of the West Vir-
ginia law may extend beyond those developed under the Sherman
Act involves exchanges and publication of statistical information.
Typically, trade associations organized on state and regional
bases, as well as on the national level, assemble and disseminate
aggregate data concerning the production and shipments of indus-
try products in transactions over preceding monthly or annual pe-
riods. The collection and distribution of these aggregated statistics
do not involve the competitor-to-competitor exchange of current
price information on a customer-by-customer basis, condemned
directly in United States v. Container Corporation' and in dicta in
the U.S. Gypsum case."0 Rather they are the sort of associational
information program sanctioned by several Sherman Act decisions
of the Supreme Court." Significantly, the Court in its 1925 lodestar
Maple Flooring decision upheld the legality of these programs,
notwithstanding their incidental stabilizing effect on production
and price. It seems almost inevitable that an exchange of produc-
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
7 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
a Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
'United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
10 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978).
"Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement
Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
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tion and shipment reports will have such a stabilizing effect. Even
in a market which approaches perfect competition, historic supply
data is likely to be used by competitors to adjust their own output
to anticipated overall production and price levels. Similar action
by all competitors, based on the same information, would produce
a restricted supply and alter the horizontal aspect of the demand
curve. Nevertheless, there seems little question but that, particu-
larly in a competitively structured industry, such a program would
not be condemned in spite of its possible effect on market price.
This result under federal law could conflict with that made possi-
ble under a literal construction of the state law's absolute prohibi-
tion of agreements "with the effect of. . . controlling or maintain-
ing the market price."' 2
The potential inconsistency between the new state Antitrust
Act and federal law also affects the monopoly provisions of section
4 of the West Virginia Act. "Monopoly" is not an offense under the
Sherman Act; monopolization, conspiracies and attempts to mo-
nopolize are offenses. The difference lies in greater tolerance under
federal law of monopoly achieved by superior skill, foresight and
ingenuity or by proximity to sources of supply or market outlets. 3
Despite some contrary suggestions in Justice Douglas' Griffith de-
cision, 4 a monopolist who legally obtains that status does not vio-
late section 2 of the Sherman Act each time he does business.
Noted authorities suggest that a monopolist may, for example,
lawfully set the price of his products at any level other than one
that is predatory." Indeed, by setting a profit-maximizing price
(the most anticompetitive course in the short run) the monopolist
is most likely to attract new competition (the most pro-
competitive in the long run). In this instance, the West Virginia
statute may produce a questionable result. The language of section
4 of the Act unqualifiedly proscribes "[t]he. . . use of a monop-
oly. . . for the purpose of excluding competition. . . or maintain-
ing prices."'" The firm with monopoly power cannot comply: if the
price is lower than the profit-maximizing level, competition may
IS W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(b)(1)(A) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
i United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
"United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
"P. AREzDA & D. TURNER, ANTTUST LAw 710-11 (1978).
I' W. VA. CODE § 47-18-4 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Carried to an even more startling
extreme, the West Virginia statute seems to condemn the acquisition and use of
patent protection, which, after all, is an attempt to establish a monopoly for the
purpose of excluding competition.
[Vol. 81
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be excluded; if higher, monopoly is being "used" to maintain
prices.
Does this analysis suggest that because of the legislature's
attempt to. specify offenses, West Virginia practitioners must now
advise their clients to abrogate exclusive territories, abolish indus-
try statistical information programs and dissolve their companies
if they may be deemed to have a monopoly in any line of commerce
in the state? Hopefully and probably not, but some judicial sculpt-
ing will be required.
The courts of this state could properly view the statutory enu-
meration of offenses in the context of an underlying mandate to
prohibit anticompetitive conduct. On this basis, the examples
given-vertical territorial restraint by a new entrant, statistical
information programs in a competitive industry, and the non-
predatory pricing of a monopolist-would probably pass muster.
None would seem to involve private action which is anticompeti-
tive in the sense of misallocating resources or impairing productive
efficiency.
Nor would the courts of the state be writing on a clean slate
in so construing the new law. The legislature prudently instructs
the courts to interpret the Act's substantive provisions "liberally
and in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable
federal antitrust statutes."1 This statutory guidance should fur-
nish the courts ample flexibility for avoiding overly restrictive con-
structions of the new law and the creation of a host of unintended
and anticompetitive per se offenses.
II.
A second area of the new Act with which defense counsel will
want to closely compare the applicable federal law is the govern-
mental investigatory and enforcement scheme. West Virginia does
not have a counterpart of the Federal Trade Commission, with its
sweeping powers to conduct inquiries and order business firms to
file extensive reports based on nothing more than idle bureaucratic
curiosity. 8 The investigative powers under section 7 of the new Act
are conferred only on the Attorney General and are circumscribed
by its provisions. These powers are in some respects broader, in
some respects narrower, than those vested in the U.S. Department
i W. VA. CoDE § 47-18-16 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
"See 15 U.S.C. §§ 46-50 (1976). See also United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950).
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of Justice under the Antitrust Civil Process Act as amended by the
Hart-Scott-Rodino law. 9
There appear to be a number of issues to which counsel for
respondent should be alert in deciding how, or whether, to answer
the Attorney General's discovery process issued under section 7.
First, the section appears to relate to investigations of past conduct
where the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that a
person has engaged in conduct violative of the section which may
warrant an investigation. Thus, the investigative power does not
appear to extend to practices about to occur, such as a merger
which might create a monopoly potentially in violation of section
4.20 This pre-1976 limitation on U.S. Department of Justice civil
demands was eliminated in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.2 '
Second, the probable cause requirement and the provision
that investigations be conducted to determine if a violation has
occurred suggest both a scope and relevancy limitation to the At-
torney General's powers. Investigations under section 7 may be
conducted only to uncover violations of the Antitrust Act, and any
investigative process which strays from that subject matter could
presumably be quashed as being beyond the authority conferred by
section 7. Further, the constitutional guarantee against unreasona-
ble search and seizure probably entitles a respondent to reasonable
notice of the purpose and scope of the investigation." The govern-
ment would appear to be obligated under section 7 of the Act at
least to notify a respondent of the nature of the suspected unlawful
practice, and the claim could be made that any inquiry not reason-
ably related to that practice is irrelevant and discovery process
related thereto could not be enforced. This conclusion is corrobor-
ated by the phrase in section 4(a) pertaining to the discovery of
"matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant
evidence."
A third significant feature of section 7 is its failure to authorize
the use of investigational interrogatories. The Federal Trade Com-
115 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1976).
2 Cf. Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co. for an Order Modifying or Setting Aside
Civil Investigative Demand No. 0016, 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Gold Bond Stamp Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir.
1964).
21 Rodino Antitrust Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976)
(to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 15c).
2 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub.
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
2 W. VA. COD. § 47-18-4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 81
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss2/3
W. VA. ANTITRUST ACT
mission has relied on pre-complaint interrogatories (more precisely
termed orders to file special reports24) as its ultimate inquisitorial
weapon, using them, for example, in its apparently successful at-
tempt to secure line-of-business operating data from major corpo-
rations.2
Unlike the Antitrust Civil Process Act and the FTC's rules
pertaining to investigative proceedings, section 7 of the West Vir-
ginia Act seems somewhat vague regarding the rights of witnesses
and those called upon to produce documents. The Antitrust Civil
Process Act provides that counsel may accompany the witness,
advise him in confidence, object to questions, and instruct the
witness not to answer any question on grounds of constitutional or
other legal privilege.26 The FTC rules accord similar rights to coun-
sel in investigative hearings 7.2 Counsel advising a respondent who
receives a subpoena under section 7 should keep in mind the possi-
bility that these rights and others available under parallel federal
law are also available under reasonable interpretations of the West
Virginia Antitrust Act. It is important to note in this regard that
section 16 of the Act requires the entire statute to be liberally
interpreted in harmony with federal standards, including proce-
dural as well as substantive provisions.
A closely related concern of respondent's counsel is the man-
ner in which discovery is to be enforced under section 7(c) of the
Act. It appears that the Attorney General's discovery orders are
not self-enforcing and that no penalty will accrue for failure to
comply prior to the issuance of a court order, assuming that the
respondent has at least a good faith doubt as to the validity of the
discovery order in question. Pre-complaint documentary and hear-
ing subpoenas under the FTC Acts are currently enforced in the
same manner, and courts have held that no penalty attaches for
non-compliance with such an administrative order.2 9 Thus, assum-
ing the good faith of the respondent and counsel, there should be
ample opportunity to secure judicial determinations regarding the
rights of witnesses in investigatory proceedings under section 7.
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1970).
2 In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, No. 77-1728 (D.C. Cir., July
10, 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978).
24 15 U.S.C.A. § 1312(i)(7) (West Supp. 1978).
2 FTC Rules for Non-Adjudicative Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 2.9 (1977).
" FTC interrogatories (orders to file reports) are self-enforcing, and failure to
respond or obtain judicial stay within the prescribed time period can result in civil
penalties of $100 per day. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1970).
2 See Eclipse Sleep Prods. of New England, Inc., v. FTC, [1962] TRDE CASES
(CCH) 70,480 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 1962).
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The requirement that all affected persons be notified of a judi-
cial enforcement proceeding raises several intriguing questions
which will be referred to in passing and which will no doubt be the
subject of litigation. First, can the provisions of section 7 be con-
strued as authorizing only an investigation of those who are sus-
pected of having committed a violation? The parallel references to
the term "person" in sections 7(a) and 7(b) so suggest; however,
the notice provisions of section 7(c) indicate a contrary result. If
the investigatory power under section 7 is not so limited, are there
other rights that a suspected offender is entitled to, such as a
notice of a judicial subpoena enforcement proceeding or the right
to be present during investigatory hearings? The provisions of sec-
tion 7(d) seem to call for a negative answer, but these are possibili-
ties that imaginative counsel for a target company may wish to
explore.
Turning briefly to the powers of the Attorney General to en-
force the substantive provisions of the Act, it appears that the
circuit courts may exercise broad equitable and remedial powers."
Although the language of the first paragraph of section 8 relative
to the granting of injunctions to restore and preserve competition
may seem somewhat ominous, it probably encompasses no greater
power than that exercised by the federal courts under section 4 of
the Sherman Act.3 ' In remedying Sherman Act offenses, federal
courts have used antitrust injunctive decrees not only to require
dissolution and divestiture," but also to impose limits on the type
of market entry,33 market share,u and pricing activities35 as well.
Defense counsel should be wary of other remedial attempts by the
enforcement agency which are of very questionable propriety. For
example, it is not at all clear that the state courts could order the
licensing or dedication of a trademark to remedy a violation of
section 4. The Federal Trade Commission has not yet been success-
ful in securing this relief in its monopoly proceedings." Further,
there would probably be serious constitutional questions as to
W. VA. CODE § 47-18-8 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
3, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
31 United States v. F & M Schaefer Brewing Co., [1967] TRADE CASES (CCH)
72,253 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1968).
31 United States v. General Motors Corp., [1965] TRADE CASES (CCH) 71,624
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 31, 1965).
3 United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1957] TRADE CASES (CCH) 68,871
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1957).
31 Borden, Inc., [1973-1976] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,651 (FTC complaint
July 2, 1974).
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whether the attempted imposition of such a remedy on an inter-
state seller might not create an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.
The civil penalty provisions of the new law are, at best, incon-
gruous and contrary to the trend of federal antitrust law. The
$200,000 penalty which could be imposed for a violation continuing
for slightly more than a year applies to any violation of the Act.
Yet, as explained above, sections 3 and 4 of the statute do not
establish distinct standards and may be construed to prohibit con-
duct which is lawful under the Sherman Act. The penalty sanc-
tions of section 8 are undeniably punitive and are very similar to
fines which might be levied for criminal conduct. For years, the
U.S. Department of Justice has initiated criminal actions only
where well-established hard core, per se offenses are involved.
More recently, the Supreme Court has held that criminal prosecu-
tion can only be successfully maintained under the Sherman Act
if it is proven that the defendant willfully committed a violation
or acted with knowledge that the probable consequences of his
conduct would be to restrain competition." It seems likely that the
limits imposed by federal law on Sherman Act criminal prosecu-
tions will be imposed on civil penalty actions under section 8 of the
West Virginia Antitrust Act. The breadth of the two laws is similar
and the essentially punitive nature of both criminal and civil pen-
alty sanctions evokes comparable treatment.3 8
I.
Questions arising under the sections of the West Virginia Anti-
trust Act providing for damages to injured parties will almost cer-
tainly generate as much, if not more, litigation than identification
of the substantive offenses. These sections authorize individual
treble damage actions" and parens patriae suits."
At least three observations are merited regarding section 9.
First, as is the case with section 4 of the Clayton Act, damage
actions are authorized for injury to the plaintiff's business or prop-
erty. There is a line of authority exemplified most recently by the
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978).
See United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974). A
defendant in a penalty proceeding under W. VA. CODE § 47-18-8 (Cum. Supp. 1978)
may be entitled to trial by jury.
" W. VA. CODE § 47-18-9 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
41 Id. § 17.
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Eighth Circuit decision in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.," holding that
the statute limits recovery to instances of injury to commercial
interests and excludes from its coverage actions by consumers. If
this reasoning is approved by the Supreme Court, a not altogether
likely prospect in light of the Court's recent acknowledgement that
the antitrust laws are designed principally to benefit consumers,"
then section 16 of the West Virginia Antitrust Act would seem
similarly to limit private actions under section 9.
Second, there is no provision in the new law comparable to
section 16 of the Clayton Act which authorizes suits by private
parties for injunctive relief. Thus, unlike the state, private liti-
gants are limited to monetary redress. Under its Antitrust Act,
West Virginia will not confront such perplexing issues as whether
dissolution may be ordered in actions initiated by private plain-
tiffs.,
Third, the state Attorney -General is authorized to initiate
actions on behalf of state, county, and municipal bodies and agen-
cies. This provision also differs from federal law in authorizing
treble damages for governmental entities, whereas section 4A of
the Clayton Act provides for recovery of only single damages for
federal agencies.
Perhaps the most aggressive extension of the West Virginia
law beyond federal standards is found in section 17 dealing with
parens patriae actions. The new state law is much more favorable
to plaintiffs than the federal statute. In comparison, the principal
thrust of the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino statute was to authorize state
Attorneys General to maintain parens patriae actions for state
residents injured as a result of violations of the federal antitrust
laws." Easily the most hotly contested segment of the 1976 law,
this provision was the subject of extensive debate in the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees and on the floor of both Houses of
Congress. As a result, a compromise measure evolved which re-
flected concessions by the opposing sides. The state legislature in
approving the West Virginia Antitrust Act seems to have swept
41 [1978-1] TRADz CASES (CCH) 62,089 (8th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed,
No. 78-690, 47 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1978).
42 Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 98 S. Ct. 2923 (1978).
41 For an example of this issue, see Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. &
Elecs. Corp., 380 F. Supp. 976 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
" Rodino Antitrust Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976)(to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 15c).
[Vol. 81
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aside all concessions to defendants and to have created a compli-
cated, plaintiff-oriented structure which could furnish little or no
actual relief for the citizens of the state.
The nature of the action which might be maintained is not at
all clear. Presumably, the authorization to the state Attorney Gen-
eral to maintain actions under the federal antitrust laws means to
maintain actions in federal courts under, and subject to, the limi-
tations of section 4C of the Clayton Act. 5 As to actions under
article 18, section 17 is ambiguous. Actions may be initiated only
on behalf of natural persons, yet the only action "under this arti-
cle" providing for any form of private recovery is the section 9
authorization for private actions for injury to business or property.
Thus, while it is clear, as under federal law, that a parens patriae
action may not be brought on behalf of business entities, unlike
federal law,46 section 17 actions appear to be only for injury to
business or property. This distinction could substantially undercut
the intended impact of section 17, especially if the Eighth Circuit
decision in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.4" becomes controlling federal
law. But even if it does not, the dependence of section 17 on other
provisions of article 18 for its operation, rather than its having
created an independent cause of action as is the case with section
4C of the Clayton Act, raises some interesting opportunities for
defendants.
It is apparent under the structure of the new law that the
Attorney General stands in no better position under section 17
than does a private plaintiff under section 9, with the possible
exception of his role as a class representative. The class members,
however, must themselves have been in a position to maintain the
action; that is, they must be capable of showing sufficient standing
and injury to have been able individually to prosecute section 9
actions. Since section 16 of the new law incorporates federal deci-
sional law, the federal antitrust law governing standing and re-
moteness apparently applies to parens patriae actions. Most im-
portantly, the principles enunciated in the Supreme Court's
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois decision8 seem fully applicable to state
actions under section 17, although probably not to parens patriae
actions by the West Virginia Attorney General under federal law.
4 Id.
49 Id.
47 [1978-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,089 (8th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed,
No. 78-690, 47 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1978).
" 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
11
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Even if Congress were to effectively overrule the Illinois Brick
decision, the road to recovery under section 17 will remain diffi-
cult. It will still be necessary to prove the fact of damage, that is,
that the alleged impact of an article 18 offense has been passed on
in a specific aggregate amount to the persons on whose behalf the
section 17 action is brought. This burden of showing the fact and
extent of damage to the class is not alleviated by the provisions of
section 17(f). Even though this provision extends well beyond the
scope of section 4C of the Clayton Act, which limits assessment of
damages to individuals by statistical methods in price-fixing cases,
section 17(f) should properly be construed as establishing a means
of allocating damages among potential claimants, not as alleviat-
ing the Attorney General's burden of proving the existence and
overall amount of injury. Nor does the duplicate recovery provision
of section 17(f)(1), which reduces recovery only by amounts ac-
tually paid to others for the same injury, necessarily create a dis-
proportionate share of compensation for citizens and residents
under section 17. It would seem essential in proving the fact of
injury to business or property of the section 17 class members that
the amount by which they were not actually damaged be deducted;
in other words, the amount properly allocable to others, such as
business entities, is not included in the chain of impact. 9
Finally, unlike section 4C of the Clayton Act, section 17 of the
West Virginia Antitrust Act contains no prohibition against con-
tingency fees." It can be expected, however, that fee awards for
outside counsel retained by the state will be subject to the federal
trend of awarding compensation for work actually performed and
not principally for the aggregate amount of recovery for the class.
In the final analysis, while the new law seems somewhat more
slanted in favor of the government and private plaintiffs, the tilt
is not decisive. The percipience of the legislature shows through in
the adoption of federal decisional law applicable to the whole of
article 18. There is ample latitude for a balanced construction of
the Act, and numerous opportunities appear for defendants' coun-
sel to raise issues which will promote such a construction.
,1 This conclusion is consistent with the amended provisions of the Clayton
Act. See Rodino Antitrust Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976)(to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 15c).
o W. VA. CoDE § 47-18-17 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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